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Linking Survival Back To Development
The idea that emergency relief should be linked to development assistance is one whose time 
has come in academic, NGO and governmental discourse but rather less so in systematic 
conceptualisation and least of all in significant resource allocation.
One reason for that shift is the rising share of emergency, and especially conflict related, 
assistance in total official development assistance. Linked is the fact that, especially in past 
armed conflict situations, the end of the conflict emergency demonstrably is only a necessary
t
not a sufficient condition for livelihood recovery.
More generally it has become clear that extended single crises - and especially a series o f them 
- whether natural calamities or human conflict catastrophes can create conditions well beyond 
household, community or national resilience levels and coping strategies. The longer the 
period and the higher the proportion of group members in need of permanent or temporary 
transfers from others, the more likely coping strategies are to erode or collapse. The 
downward spiral of many nomadic communities in the Sahel is an example as much as the 
conflict-linked catastrophic disempowerment evident in much of rural Angola or the mixed 
drought/war cases exemplified by Tigre in Ethiopia.
Coping - ironically - has come to academic prominence, like long rotation cropping, a decade 
or so after contextual pressures had begun to reduce its viability in many areas in which it 
formerly worked well. Restoring it - at least without at least partly externally (nationally and 
internationally) rehabilitation is a romantic illusion.
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working capital preservation) relevant to household post emergency economic viability is a 
strong one. So is that for phasing from survival into rehabilitation (e.g. work for wages 
programmes to provide for physical reconstruction and living until crops are to hand 
analogous to the wages on agricultural enterprise would pay to rehabilitate a drought or war 
damaged estate and charge up to capital investment). In the longer run rural development 
programming needs to pay attention to the particular contextual access problems of small 
farming families as much as to those of - e.g. - female headed and non-standard crop (e.g. peri 
urban truck gardening) households. This is particularly true for pastoralists as rain usually 
brings dead fields back to life but - as Somali pastoralists regularly point out - not dead flocks 
and herds whose re-establishment poses major capital requirements which are often 
insurmountable if extended family loan in kind coping has broken down and no national 
analogue has been created.
In Reality
At present the division between emergency survival relief and development assistance is wide 
in types o f funding, eligibility/conditionality, institutions and styles and general approach to 
beneficiaries. Neither side looks to how its actions influence the other ex ante or ex post and - 
in recipients as well as donors but more in the latter - they often operate in parallel but isolated 
compartments. This is true from macro to project level, e.g. at best SAPs build on average or 
trend agricultural growth but never model in emergency output shortfall years or costs. Since 
droughts (much less wars) do affect other sectors by water and input shortages on the supply 
side and rural entitlements (demand) collapse on the demand side this is a non-trivial mis- 
specification.
Articulated development in relief through reconstruction/rehabilitation to continued 
rehabilitation in development programmes are rare albeit Mozambique and, in practice if not 
literal terminology, Ethiopia and Eritrea are exceptions. That is not unrelated to recovery
3(often seen by donors as an excuse to hang on to emergency consumption aid) is about as well 
regarded at a Donors Conference as a pre-transformation Cinderella in domestic helper's rags 
would have been at the fashionable ball.
Some Complexities, Contextualities, Conundrums
Survival - Rehabilitation/Reconstruction - Development is a useful heuristic sequence. But it 
cannot usefully be understood as a set o f linear boxes nor as a recreation of the status quo ex 
ante nor o f the previous growth dynamic. Certainly vulnerability reduction is a logical priority 
and does imply rehabilitation toward altered livelihood and development patterns. And some 
war destroyed physical facilities - e.g. state farms and settler villas are hardly priorities for 
reconstruction.
But many small farming households when asked (somewhat rare) do give top priority to 
"going home" (not to "being resettled"), to rebuilding of the schools-clinics-wells they once 
had and to restoration o f market access both as to roads and as to traders and transporters. In 
general drought stricken ex-pastoralists have not shifted to ex-urban income scratching or to 
cropping by choice but because the capital for a core herd to rehabilitate their pastoral 
livelihood was unattainable.
Equally - as in almost any staged model of a dynamic process - the stages overlap as well as 
interpenetrate. One very strong case for early food (or work to earn to buy food) assistance 
during a drought is to enable households to stay on their farms. This has positive emergency 
health protection and housing cost reduction implications but it is also vital to enabling 
households to keep farms in order and to be ready to rehabilitate promptly when the rains 
return.
By the same token Tanzanians have not chosen full rehabilitation of rural health-education- 
water (admittedly more fiscal than calamity or conflict impacted) as preceding new 
development. "We Shall Never Go Back" is in fact an affirmation o f a new nearly national
4community initiative/government personnel support/limited external finance package centred 
on nutrition and health (with a growing women's income generation component) but also a 
decision not to return to less bottom-up and more uniform programming.
One problem in linkage is in fact that emergency programming tends not merely to be top 
down internally (though both Botswana's and Tanzania's drought relief is largely domestic 
demand driven and local government handled) but also outside internationally. This means 
emergency practitioners often do not speak the same language let alone share the same 
concepts as development ones. More basically it means long run, high profile emergency 
programmes decapacitate domestic institutions in relief as well as development. In both 
Mozambique and Ethiopia national (decentralised provincial in the Mozambique case) 
domestic emergency capacity was co-opted, taken over, paralleled, bypassed and/or 
decapacitated by donors and their foreign NGOs to a degree virtually unheard of in the 
development field. In the Southern African 1991/93 drought and hunger case the UN's 
Humanitarian Office's initial presumption was that no national or regional institutional and 
operating capacity existed.
Therefore, linking survival relief through rehabilitation support to development assistance 
requires real changes o f structures and attitudes as well as o f programme design and 
instructions. In conflict situations local government capacity is normally an early casualty so 
that unless its recapacitation is made a domestic priority severe constraints on decentralised, 
participatory, contextual approaches will remain whatever donors, external NGOs and central 
ministries might propose and even desire.
The rehabilitation field - even more than development more generally - is highly contextual. 
What is needed and possible in one province o f one country may be low priority or impossible 
not only in another country but also in another province (or district) o f the same one. For 
example, in internally displaced person cases many districts will have substantial inflows and 
outflows whether the balance is positive or negative and even in the most war decapacitated 
countries the degree of physical damage varies widely. Grass roots input on basic data (not
5least where the mines are unless one wishes a programme blow up) and on household 
priorities are a necessary condition for success even if collection is not on a sample survey 
basis nor the procedures fully participatory. That is one reason for recapacitating domestic 
central and local governments and social sector organisations who are closer to the ground 
and , at least potentially, more accountable than an external donor - international, 
governmental or NGO - can ever be or become.
Costs And Benefits
Rehabilitation can in principle return double benefits. For example, wages for work augment 
household incomes this does meet survival needs but also restores (or adds to) infrastructure 
and provides demand to support the recovery of local market oriented food production and of 
the trader/transporters to validate it. Handouts do the first, not the second and have a 
negative impact on the third. Standard works approaches (unless very unusually labour 
intensive) meet the second and third tests but - if there is any financial or skilled personnel 
constraint - cannot do all of the first.
However, the real cost/benefit equations are more complex - and far from totally economic. 
Unless drawn up in advance and with local input emergency related, public works do not yield 
a value fully equal to cost, albeit there is no reason in principle why they should not. Further, 
they do require non-wage costs (including skilled personnel, e.g. foremen and 
design/supervision engineers) o f at least half the wage cost, a fiscal problem even if the value 
of the works is well above that o f the additional cost. Conceivably they also divert skilled 
personnel albeit if the projects are high priority rural works, that is far from self-evident.
And there is the parallel issue o f "low potential" areas. Absolutely poor people tend to be a 
disproportionately high per cent of their population. The macro (or even household) 
opportunity cost o f "high" to "low" potential shifts can be significant. But mass transfer 
programmes are rarely successful (partly because state auspices ones are rarely truly
voluntary) and are very expensive. Unless the alternative to rehabilitation/capacity raising is 
triage not relief, it is not self-evident that the output gain/incremental cost ratio for 
rehabilitation (versus pure relief) need be low.
Finally, massive rehabilitation (post war but also post massive drought) has multiplier effects. 
These cannot, by their nature, be captured at project level. In the Mozambique case five years 
of ex-emergency plus Mozambican refugees support could, including multiplier effects, double 
national output, cut malnutrition and absolute poverty by half and be self-sustaining on fiscal 
and external account in six to eight years according to calculations no worse than normal 
African macroeconomic projections. Ethiopia, Eritrea and probably Liberia are likely to be 
similar cases as is Angola abstracting from the petroleum sector.
Where Next?
The workshop on which this volume is based and the papers in it, examine all of the foregoing 
and related issues in greater depth and complexity. Their broad conclusion is that while more 
conceptual, contextual and comparative work is needed, the highest present priority is 
probably what could be called action research. Enough processual and contextual knowledge 
and enough tool kits for action exist to justify a variety o f substantial initiatives which - apart 
from their direct impact on lives, livelihoods and economies - would rapidly expand 
knowledge on what worked where, why, how far, in what contexts and how.
smbull.doc/rhg/sh/july94
